Report reviewing existing large-scale scenarios and reasons for selection of the set most relevant to European water issues for the fast-track process, SCENES Deliverable 2.2 by Kok, K. & Alcamo, J.
 
 
GOCE 036822 
 
SCENES 
Water Scenarios for Europe and for Neighbouring States 
 
 
Instrument: Integrated Project 
Thematic priority: Global change and ecosystems 
 
 
 
Deliverable 2.2  
Report reviewing existing large-scale scenarios and reasons for 
selection of the set most relevant to European water issues for the 
fast-track process 
 
  
 
Due date of deliverable: 31.10.2007 
Actual submission date: 10.10.2007 
 
 
Start date of project: 1.11.2006   Duration: 48 months 
 
Wageningen University 
 
 
     Revision Final 
 
Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006) 
Dissemination Level  
PU Public X 
PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)  
RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)  
CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)  
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
 
The information in this document is provided as is and no guarantee or warranty is 
given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the 
information at its sole risk and liability. 
 
 
Legal Notice 
 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on the behalf of the 
Commission is responsible for the use, which might be made of the following 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deliverable 2.2 
(SCENES WorkPackage 2, scenarios) 
 
Report reviewing existing large-scale scenarios and reasons 
for selection of the set most relevant to European water 
issues for the fast-track process 
 
Kasper Kok1 and Joseph Alcamo2 
 
 
 
1: Department of Environmental Sciences, Wageningen University, Wageningen, the 
Netherlands 
2: CESR, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kok, K., Alcamo, J. Report reviewing existing large-scale scenarios and reasons for 
selection of the set most relevant to European water issues for the fast-track process. 
SCENES Deliverable 2.2, Wageningen University, Wageningen.   
 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
This Deliverable consists of two parts. Part 1 contains the review of a set of existing 
global and European scenarios and the selection of the set that is most relevant for use 
in SCENES. Part 2 contains a detailed description of a set of scenario archetypes and 
the four scenarios in the set that was selected (GEO-4). This second part thus goes 
beyond the original requirements of the Deliverable. The description serves a double 
purpose of providing insight in the actual content of some of the sets of scenarios and 
a means to document the GEO-4 scenarios and their relation to water issues. As such 
it also complements Milestone 2.2, “Review of pan-European scenarios”. 
 
PART 1 – SCENARIO REVIEW AND SELECTION OF MOST RELEVANT 
SET FOR SCENES 
 
Kasper Kok and Joseph Alcamo 
 
1.1 Introduction 
At the Kick-off meeting of SCENES, a time mismatch between activities of WP2 and 
WP3 was identified. The deadline for WP2 to evaluate existing large-scale scenarios 
and select the most relevant set for the fast-track process is month 12: “D 2.2 Report 
reviewing existing large-scale scenarios and reasons for selection of the set most 
relevant to European water issues for the fast-track process. (month 12)”. However, 
the deadline for WP3 to produce a first set of quantitative fast-track scenarios is also 
month 12: “D 3.1 Fast track modelling results (month 12)”. 
 
The conclusion was that in order for WP3 to proceed, it was absolutely necessary to 
make a decision as soon as possible on which set of scenarios would be used for the 
fast-track. Obviously this does not mean that later in the process the set could be 
altered and/or expanded, but we needed to define our common starting point. We 
therefore planned a meeting between the (co-)leaders of WP2 and WP3 in December 
2006 to quickly evaluate the existing large-scale scenarios and propose a set to be 
used in the fast-track procedure. The following analysis is based on this evaluation. 
 
1.2 Selection of most relevant scenario study 
A first step was to define European and/or global scenarios studies that are potentially 
relevant for SCENES. We selected the following 7 studies: 
1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios – IPCC-SRES (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). In our 
evaluation we included a number of recent studies that used the IPCC-SRES 
storylines and enriched + downscaled them to Europe. Most important are the 
A-TEAM (Rounsevell et al., 2006); EURURALIS (Westhoek et al., 2006); 
and PRELUDE (EEA, 2007). All scenario sets have four scenarios, termed 
A1, A2, B1, and B2 in the original IPCC-SRES assessment, while some of the 
European studies have given names (see also Part 2). 
2. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment – MA (see Carpenter et al., 2005). The 
MA included global scenarios as well as a number of so-called sub-global 
assessments of which some were carried out in Europe (Portugal, Sweden 2x). 
These were included in the evaluation although it concerns mostly rather 
localised studies. All scenario sets have four scenarios, Global Orchestration; 
Techno Garden; Adaptive Mosaic; and Order from Strength. 
3. Global Environment Outlook – GEO-3/GEO-4 (for GEO-3 see UNEP, 
2002; for GEO-4 see UNEP, 2007). Because the GEO-4 scenarios were not 
available at the time of the evaluation, we included the previous scenario work 
as carried out within GEO-3. There are four scenarios called Policy First; 
Markets First; Security First; and Sustainability First. 
4. Visions/MedAction (see Rotmans et al. (2000) for Visions and Kok et al. 
(2006a and 2006b) for MedAction). These two projects include European 
scenarios; Mediterranean scenarios; local case study scenarios; and European 
visions. There are three European scenarios, Big is Beautiful?; Convulsive 
Change; and Knowledge is King. 
5. World Water Vision – WWV (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). The WWV 
includes three water-specific global scenarios: BAU, ‘Technology, economics, 
and private sector’, and ‘Values and Lifestyles’. It included some specific 
information on Western Europe. 
6. EEA European Water Outlook. (to be published; see also EEA, 2005). 
There are three scenarios.  
7. Global Water Outlook – GWO (Rosegrant et al., 2002). Included are three 
water specific scenarios with BAU, Sustainable world, and Water Crisis.  
 
We can basically distinguish three types of scenario studies: 
• Global integrated scenario studies that are very complete and normally 
distinguish four scenarios along two main uncertainties and elaborated 
storylines and quantitative models. These studies usually do not focus 
specifically on water. These studies are IPCC-SRES; GEO-4; MA. 
• Scenario studies that focus specifically on water. These studies are usually far 
less elaborate and include only sketchy storylines. These studies are World 
Water Vision; Global Water Outlook; EEA European Water Outlook. 
• Studies that are specific for Europe. These include Visions/MedAction and the 
various downscaling studies from IPCC-SRES (ATEAM, EURuralis, 
PRELUDE). 
 
After deciding on the relevant studies, we listed the main characteristics of each study 
including the main advantages and disadvantages regarding their application in 
SCENES (see Table 1). Subsequently, we (semi-)quantified the main characteristics 
by scoring each characteristic for each scenario study. Finally, we provided a 
weighting factor for issues that we considered more important. We gave particular 
weight to storyline elaboration, European specificity (including downscaling 
exercises), availability of gridded driving forces, scientific acceptance, relation to 
water issues, and currency. Our simple objective scoring and weighting gave the final 
scores presented in Table 2. Please keep in mind that the tabular information should 
merely be regarded as systematic background information; not as strict selection 
criteria.  
 
 
Table 1. Main characteristics of selected scenario studies 
Scenarios Time 
horizon 
Spatial 
extent 
Advantages Disadvantages 
IPCC (downscaled) 2100 
(2030/50) 
Global 
(EU15/25) 
Applied in sub-global settings 
European versions available 
Focus of European studies not on 
water 
Quantified water scenarios available 
for Europe 
Climate oriented 
Rudimentary 
storylines 
Outdated 
Climate oriented 
MA (SGAs) 2050 Global 
(local) 
Elaborated storylines 
Water scenarios available for Europe 
Very recent 
Quantified water scenarios 
available  
Storylines not 
downscaled for Europe 
Ecosystem oriented 
GEO-4 (GEO-3) 2050 
(2032) 
Regional 
(global) 
Brand new! 
Elaborated European storylines 
developed by stakeholders 
Quantified water scenarios 
available for Europe 
Storylines brief 
Not finalised until late 
2007 
Input from scientists 
small 
Visions/MedAction 2050/2030 European Specific for Europe 
Detail for Mediterranean 
Very elaborated storylines 
Information on water 
is limited 
Some scenarios are 
less plausible 
No water 
quantification 
available. 
World Water Vision 2025 Global Water-specific scenarios 
On-going process and discussion 
Sketchy for Europe 
Outdated? 
BAU + two variations 
EEA European 
Water Outlook 
2030 European Recent and available Only quantitative 
Very sketchy 
storylines 
Global Water 
Outlook 
2025 Global Water-specific scenarios 
Some storyline information 
Mainly quantitative 
BAU + two variations 
 
 
Table 2. Scoring table of main characteristics and weighting factor for each of the 
selected scenario studies. 
Criterion IPCC 
(down- 
scaling) 
MA GEO-4 WWV Visions/ 
Med-
Action  
EEA Eur 
Water 
Outlook 
Global 
Water 
Outlook 
Weighting 
Factor 
Storyline elaboration + creativity + 
complexity 
4 8 6 4 7 1 4 3x 
European specificity (including 
downscaling exercises) 
6 (8) 4 8 3 9 9 4 3x 
Time horizon 
 
4 (8) 6 6 8 7 9 8 1x 
Availability of gridded driving forces 
 
8 8 8 8 2 9 5 2x 
Scientific acceptance 
 
9 7 7 5 5 5 5 2x 
Policy acceptance for water 
 
1 4 4 4 4 6 4 1x 
Information on water 
 
2 6 6 6 6 8 6 2x 
How current? 
 
6 8 9 
 
4 7 5 6 2x 
Date of publication/ 
Current availability 
9 9 4 9 8 8 9 1x 
Total Score 
 
94 (104) 113 116 88 107 107 89  
 
 
From the information in Table 1 and Table 2 we started an elimination procedure: 
Two of the water-specific studies (WWV and GWO) score low on the 
comprehensiveness of the storylines, as well as on the scientific acceptance, while in 
the rapidly advancing field of scenario development, they are relatively outdated. To 
some extent, the same holds for the EEA European Water Outlook, but this is a recent 
study within which WaterGAP is being applied for Europe. However, storylines are 
so brief that they are not suitable for the application in WP2 of SCENES. In other 
words, we dismissed all specifically water-related scenario studies as being useful 
within the fast-track procedure of SCENES. All Europe-scale scenario studies scored 
slightly higher, but they all have important drawbacks: Although storylines in 
Visions/MedAction are among the most elaborate, the study provides mainly 
qualitative data, which make it unsuitable for WP3. The various European studies that 
developed downscaled versions of the IPCC-SRES storylines score low on the policy 
acceptance and on the information on water. Additionally, gridded information on 
driving forces is not always available. We therefore narrowed down our options to the 
three global studies, IPCC-SRES, MA, and GEO-4. Of these three the IPCC has most 
disadvantages (simple storylines; relatively outdated; and overly focused on climate 
for our purposes). This left us with the MA and GEO-4. The key differences between 
both studies are clear from Table 2. The MA scores significantly lower on European 
specificity, while GEO-4 has simpler storylines, certainly compared with the MA 
where storylines are the most elaborate of all studies considered here. The decisive 
factor proved to be the date of publication. GEO-4 will be published in the course of 
2007 and is therefore the most recent of all studies. A potential drawback is that it 
might be problematic to acquire the preliminary versions of both storylines and 
quantitative model runs. As WP3 is heavily involved in the scenario activities within 
GEO-4, this was not considered to be a problem in practice.  
 
Thus, GEO-4 was selected as the most relevant set of scenarios, and therefore the set 
that was selected as input for the fast-track procedure. 
 
1.3 Similarities and complementarities  
The high degree of similarity between the various scenario studies is an important 
observation that we took into account when making this recommendation. Various 
recent publications have compared the underlying assumptions of a number of sets of 
scenarios and have classified them into a relatively small group of scenario archetypes 
(e.g. Busch, 2006; Raskin et al., 2005). Moreover, often the models used to quantify 
these assumptions were the same in different studies. These similarities in underlying 
assumptions, storylines, and model quantification will be further elaborated in Part 2 
of this Deliverable which will contain a full review and comparison of the existing 
scenario studies. Here it suffices to note that there are large overlaps between the 
different scenarios. Consequently, selecting one set of scenarios (GEO-4) does not 
exclude using information from other studies while constructing the fast-track 
scenarios. For example, for WP2, the MA scenarios with their elaborated storylines 
bear relevance and information from the MA storylines will be incorporated where 
possible. WP3 will make use of the current involvement of WaterGAP in the EEA 
World Water scenarios and in the MA, besides the involvement of CESR in GEO-4.  
 
 
PART 2 – SCENARIO ARCHETYPES AND THE GEO-4 SCENARIOS 
 
Kasper Kok 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Part 1, it was concluded that the global scenario assessments of IPCC-SRES, GEO-
3/GEO-4, and MA bear most relevance to the scenario development in SCENES. 
Moreover, all of these studies developed four scenarios, using a similar methodology. 
We therefore limited our evaluation of scenario archetypes to those global studies. To 
those we added the Visions/MedAction study, because of the elaborate storylines, and 
the work of the Global Scenario Group (GSG). The scenarios developed by the GSG 
were essentially the first effort to develop a set of global storylines (Gallopin et al., 
1997; Raskin et al., 1998; Raskin et al., 2002). All subsequent global assessments 
were based on these first scenarios to a greater or lesser extent. The importance of 
GSG scenarios lies, however, primarily in the fact that they were the first. Therefore, 
they were not included in the selection procedure of Part 1, but they are in this 
construction of scenario archetypes.  
 
2.2 Past scenario classification efforts 
There have been various recent attempts to classify the wealth of scenario studies 
(Zurek, 2006; Busch, 2006; Westhoek et al., 2007). All of these attempted to group 
the individual scenarios. The archetypes that are presented below draw heavily on the 
classes that have been proposed by these studies. However, all efforts to review 
existing scenarios have focused on the quantitative scenarios. That is, differences 
between scenarios are analysed by using the quantitative assumptions and parameter 
settings in the various models that were used. This has been a very useful and clear 
method of comparison, because only a small number of different models has been 
employed in the different scenario assessment. Often-employed models are IMAGE, 
WaterGAP, AIM, and IMPACT. However, the aim of WP2 is at the construction of 
scenarios that are largely qualitative in nature. Thus, for a good description of 
scenario archetypes in this case, it becomes essential to compare the storylines that 
underlie the model settings. A thorough comparison of the narratives is as yet lacking. 
This Deliverable attempts to classify the existing scenarios and subsequently combine 
elements from the different scenarios (with a different focus) into archetypes that thus 
are richer than the original storylines. The main objectives of Part 2 are thus to 
identify and describe the scenario archetypes, and to substantiate the link between 
those archetypes and the GEO-4 scenarios. Through this link, it becomes feasible to 
supplement the GEO-4 scenarios with information from the corresponding scenario 
archetype.  
 
 
2.3 Four scenario archetypes 
All major projects considered here have used by and large the same methodology to 
develop scenarios. First, a list of major drivers is assembled (economic development; 
population growth etc., see also Table 4). Based on this list two critical uncertainties 
are selected, which are subsequently used as a coordinate system, defining four 
quadrants and thus four scenarios. All major assessments have used two critical 
uncertainties that are very similar, and that can be described as: 
1. Global versus regional development.  
2. Proactive versus reactive attitude towards the environment. Alternative 
descriptions are economy/environment; self-interest/solidarity; low/high level 
of regulations.  
The global/regional axis is present in all scenario studies under exactly the same 
name, and there seems to be little discussion on either its naming or what is indicated 
by the uncertainty. The second uncertainty is termed differently in the various 
scenario studies, which reflects minor differences in how the uncertainty (and thus the 
resulting scenarios) is interpreted. For example, the MA uses proactive/reactive to the 
environment which focuses the uncertainty on environmental issues. The 
EURURALIS study uses high/low regulation, which covers a broader spectrum of 
sectors. Yet, in practice the underlying assumptions and interpretations given in the 
actual storylines are very similar. Figure 1 depicts two uncertainties and the names of 
the scenarios in the several scenario studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Two main uncertainties and corresponding scenarios in five scenario studies. 
 
 
Unfortunately, at first glance it seems that the set of scenarios developed within GEO 
only partly fit in this framework. As illustrated in Figure 2, Markets First and Security 
First fit, while some of the assumptions in Policy First are not very pro-active 
towards the environment, while Sustainability First is a mix between bottom-up and 
top-down forces. Yet, the final situation in Sustainability First strongly resembles the 
end situation in a compartmentalised, proactive world such as sketched for example in 
the MA scenario Adapting Mosaic. Similarly, the endpoint in Policy First resembles 
in many ways a (moderate) version of for example a B1-world. In other words, the 
four GEO scenarios can be mapped on the four scenario archetypes, albeit with some 
caution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Position of the GEO-3/4 scenarios on the uncertainty axes. 
 
 
An excellent starting point to define the scenario archetypes are the scenarios 
developed by the Global Scenario Group. First, this group of scenarios has served as 
example and/or input for all subsequent global scenario studies. Second, the GSG 
defined six scenarios such that they can both cover the GEO scenarios and the set of 
scenarios defined by most other global studies. Table 3 provides the basic 
classification of six scenarios archetypes in four main categories.  
 
Table 3. Scenario archetypes and comparison with other scenario studies. 
Classification GSG GEO-3/4 IPCC MA Visions/ 
MedAction 
I. The Global 
Market  
Conventional – 
Market Forces 
Markets First A1 (A1b) Global 
Orchestration 
Big is Beautiful 
(first decade) 
II. Continental 
Barriers 
a. Fortress 
Barbarisation –  
Fortress World 
Security First A2 Order from 
Strength 
Big is Beautiful 
(last decade) 
II. Continental 
Barriers 
b. Collapse 
Barbarisation – 
Breakdown 
- - - c.f. Big is 
Beautiful 
(middle-term) 
IIIa. Global 
Sustainability 
a. Policy 
Conventional –   
Policy Reform 
Policy First B1(B1-450) (elements of 
Global 
Orchestration) 
-  
IIIb. Global 
Sustainability 
b. Technology 
Great Transitions 
– New 
Sustainability 
Sustainability 
First (global 
elements) 
(elements of 
B1) 
Techno 
Garden 
Knowledge is 
King 
IV. Regional 
Sustainability 
Great Transitions 
– Eco-
communalism 
Sustainability 
First (local 
elements) 
B2 Adapting 
Mosaic 
(elements of 
Convulsive 
Change) 
 
 
 
 
In summary the scenario archetypes can be classified as follows: 
I. The Global Market. Global, reactive, economy-based developments lead to 
dominance of the international markets with a low level of regulations. 
II. Continental Barriers. Regional, reactive, economy-based world, with a broadening 
gap between rich and poor, and higher levels of crime, violence, and terrorism. The 
GSG developed a second variation in which the world as we know it would largely 
collapse. This variation has not been developed in any other scenario study. 
III. Global Sustainability. A global world with an increasingly proactive attitude 
towards the environment and a high level of regulation, with two variants. In the 
Policy variation, the emphasis is on top-down policy regulations and international 
laws that protect the environment and social capital. In the Technology variation, 
technological breakthroughs – besides a higher level of policy intervention – reduce 
the burden on the environment. 
IV. Regional Sustainability. Regional world where most initiatives to proactively 
improve the state of the environment are bottom-up, eventually trickling up to 
international policy making.  
 
The GEO-3/4 scenarios are examples of the archetypes I (Markets First), IIa (Security 
First), and IIIa (Policy First). Sustainability First is a mix between archetype IIIb and 
IV, having stronger similarities with type IV. Below is a detailed description of all 
main scenario archetypes, emphasising those that match the GEO scenarios. 
 
I The Global Market 
Virtually all sets of scenarios have a version of Global Market. In describing the 
Conventional World scenarios, the Global Scenario Group points out that in these 
futures the global system evolves without major surprise, sharp discontinuity, or 
fundamental transformation in the basis of human civilization. The dominant forces 
and values currently driving globalization shape the future (Raskin et al., 2002). In 
other words, in many ways this scenario could also be regarded as a (positive) 
Business As Usual.  
 
GEO-3 Markets First 
Most of the world adopts the values and expectations prevailing in today’s 
industrialized countries. The wealth of nations and the optimal play of market forces 
dominate social and political agendas. Trust is placed in further globalization and 
liberalization to enhance corporate wealth, create new enterprises and livelihoods, and 
so help people and communities to afford to insure against social and environmental 
problems. Ethical investors, together with citizen and consumer groups, try to exercise 
growing corrective influence but are undermined by economic imperatives. The 
powers of state officials, planners and lawmakers to regulate society, economy and 
the environment continue to be overwhelmed by expanding demands (see Westhoek 
et al., 2007). 
 
GEO-3 Markets First – Other relevant points 
Most important driving forces are:  
• increase in food demand 
• increased energy consumption 
• free trade 
• phasing out of agricultural subsidies 
• technological advances 
• increased demand for biofuels 
 
Water-related impacts 
• privatisation of ‘water’ 
• improvements in water technology (desalinisation; irrigation systems) 
• increased water use efficiency 
• focus on augmenting water supply (to meet increasing demand) 
• water stress increases (supply cannot meet demand) 
• issue of patents on water technology (especially for poorer regions) 
• increase in volume of wastewater / technology cannot keep up 
• quality of surface water decreases (more irrigation, more fertilisers, more 
intensive livestock). Problem occurs in all regions. 
 
This scenario archetype describes a world in which water-related impacts will grow. 
On the positive side, multiple new water technologies will be developed that will 
increase water-use efficiency. These include large-scale water transport plans that will 
locally strongly increase water supply. However, these improvements cannot keep 
pace with the increases in water demand, driven by the strong economic growth. 
Worse yet are problems with water quality. The volume of waster water increases and 
the quality of both surface water and groundwater decreases in most parts of the 
world, caused by an overall neglect of environmental problems.   
 
GEO-4 – Europe 
• globalisation and liberalisation are embraced and trade barriers are removed 
• technological innovations spread quickly 
• cutbacks in social security system – massive inequality 
• shortage high-skilled labour 
• increased immigration 
• “a series of market and government failures” (after 2030) 
• “frustration especially in Eastern Europe” (of less investments in infrastructure 
and energy grid) 
• unemployment increases & deep recession 
• agricultural subsidies phased out; Less Favoured Areas disappear. Extensive 
land abandoned, intensive agriculture intensifies. 
• Increase wastewater in Central and Eastern Europe.  
• Hot-spots of water pollution throughout Europe. 
 
Summarising, the European version of the Global Market is a rather negative version 
of the global storyline. It assumes that Europe will be outcompeted in the long run by 
other regions; that multinationals do not take the full responsibility of education, 
social security, energy supply, environmental protection etc., while agricultural 
subsidies disappear. On top of that climate change starts to be a serious factor. In 
general, however, most of the negative consequences are assumed to take place after 
2030. Shorter-term changes are mostly related to agriculture. Also, it seems that 
technological advances could be beneficial. Note that in assuming a lesser economic 
growth, the pressure on the environment and thus on water quantity and quality will 
be less.  
 
 
II Continental Barriers 
All sets of scenarios also have one in which market and policy adjustments are not 
able to cope with social, economic and environmental problems as they arise. Instead, 
they cascade into self-amplifying crises that overwhelm the coping capacity of 
conventional institutions. The result is a compartmentalised world, with augmented 
differences between rich and poor and strong regional barriers. In the most pessimistic 
versions (e.g. Barbarisation – Breakdown from the GSG), civilization descends into 
anarchy or tyranny; while in the more optimistic versions, the regionalised world 
prospers. However, by and large underlying assumptions of the future worlds are very 
similar.  
 
GEO-3  Security First 
This scenario assumes a world of striking disparities where inequality and conflict 
prevail. Socio-economic and environmental stresses give rise to waves of protest and 
counteraction. As such troubles become increasingly prevalent, the more powerful 
and wealthy groups focus on self-protection, creating enclaves much like the present 
day ‘gated communities’. Such islands of advantage provide a degree of enhanced 
security and economic benefits for dependent communities in their immediate 
surroundings but they exclude the disadvantaged mass of outsiders. Welfare and 
regulatory services fall into disuse but market forces continue to operate outside the 
walls. 
 
GEO-3 Security First – Other relevant points 
• security and market forces dominate global agenda 
• little attention is paid to social and environmental issues 
• widespread believe in market forces as regulators of social welfare 
• increasing number of conflicts 
• Eastern Europe makes little economic progress 
• short-term crises dominate government and NGO agendas 
• economic malaise 
• technological advances (agriculture, medicine, environmental) 
• eventually slowdown in advances in all sectors 
• poor-rich divide & rich dominate and dictate the poor 
• exploding mega-cities 
• violence becomes endemic 
• “islands of prosperity” in gated communities 
• globalisation continues (between bubbles of wealth) 
 
Water-relevant impacts 
• climate change is severe with extreme events with a staggering financial price 
• widespread droughts, high water demand, water transfer projects 
• deterioration of arable land (emptying of the countryside) 
• excessive waste puts burden on ‘poor’ regions 
• overuse of water 
• decreasing water quality (fouling of water) 
• “uneasy stability by 2032” 
 
This scenario archetype projects developments that are both good and bad for water-
related issues. First and foremost, the regionalised and divided world cannot 
successfully combat climate change, leading to widespread extreme events. There are 
also widespread problems with increased water demand (by the rich) and overuse of 
water, but most of the problems are the burden of the poor. The situation slightly 
improves by 2030 due to new technologies that ‘fix’ part of the problem. Yet, the rich 
benefit more than the poor. 
 
GEO-4 – Security First for Europe  
• main drivers are global insecurity, conflicts, limited freedom, and climate 
change 
• EU stops enlargement 
• Eastern Europe turns to the Far East 
• brain drain 
• corruption, nationalism, intolerance 
• unprecedented environmental degradation 
• strong national governments 
• use of old technology 
• high costs to combat impacts of climate change 
• sharp increases of water demand  
• agriculture is subsidised 
 
Summarising, the European version of the Security First scenario by and large follows 
the global storyline. It pictures a grim vision of the future with an extremely high 
pressure on the environment because of an increased demand and because of the 
effects of climate change. Also, the braindrain and thus use of old technologies leads 
to a downward spiral. War, terrorism, and violence are less emphasised. Like in the 
global version, there is a somewhat more positive outlook for the period after 2032. 
Even though the European version is slightly less negative then the global outlook, it 
is by far the most negative of the four scenarios.  
 
IIb: Collapse 
One scenario – Barbarisation-Breakdown – goes beyond the general storyline 
followed in most scenarios, ending up in a world that is not very pleasant to live in. 
The total collapse of society as we know it, was regarded as too extreme to be either 
plausible or credible by most scenario studies. Besides, the usefulness of these very 
extreme scenarios has been questioned in general (Kok et al., 2006b). 
 
 
These two types of scenario archetypes can be regarded as ‘BAU when all goes well’ 
and ‘BAU when all goes wrong’. The visions start to differ slightly more, when the 
emphasis is on scenarios that incorporate more drastic changes from the onset and that 
assume profound transformations in the fundamental values and organising principles 
of society. The most plausible, least differentiating assumptions can be typified in a 
third archetype that is shared by most scenario studies: 
 
 
 
III Global Sustainability 
Essentially, this scenario assumes a globalised world, in which governments and 
businesses alike successfully take responsibility to fight a number of the pressing 
issues of today, such as poverty and environmental degradation. Similarly, 
investments in science and technology lead to a large number of breakthroughs and 
inventions that significantly contribute towards a sustainable world. More so than in 
the previous two scenario archetypes, there are differences between the various 
scenario studies in which of the elements above is most strongly emphasised. In fact, 
this archetype could be subdivided into two: 
IIIa Policy solutions 
IIIb Technological solutions 
What connects these two archetypes is that in both a globally connected world is 
portrayed, where certain groups of actors – scientists and governments – have a 
deciding role in a successful road towards a more sustainable road. The following 
scenarios can broadly be placed under these archetypes:  
 
IIIa Global Sustainability – Policy solutions 
This archetype has a similar basic philosophy as the Global Market, but includes 
policies to correct market failures with respect to social development, poverty 
alleviation and environmental protection. Contrary to the Global Market, these 
policies are not assumed to fix problems after they arise, but assumes them to become 
effective from the very beginning. In other words, although the way society is 
functioning does not change fundamentally, the effect of the policies, both directly on 
environmental problems and indirectly on human behaviour, is much stronger.  
 
GEO-3 Policy First  
Governments take far-reaching initiatives to reach specific social and environmental 
goals. A coordinated pro-environment and anti-poverty programme is designed and 
implemented at any (economic) cost. Policy measures and regulatory frameworks are 
reinforced by fiscal levers or incentives such as carbon taxes and tax breaks. 
International treaties and binding instruments affecting environment and development 
are integrated into unified blueprints. This predominantly top-down process later 
gives way to an open consultation processes which allows for regional and local 
participation. 
 
GEO-3 Policy First  – Other relevant points  
• climate change reduced 
• global equality achieved (“Global Gini Index”) 
• increased public investment in health, education, R&D, environmental 
protection. 
• economic and political integration 
• focus on environmental protection 
• removal of agricultural policies (but replaced by Rural Development 
Programmes, or other environmental protection measures) 
• biofuel area increased 
 
Most important water-related impacts: 
• strong investments in increasing water supply and decreasing demand 
• social and political institutions help manage water resources 
• increased water treatment, but it does not keep pace with increases in demand. 
But in Europe the situation is very good, with a 50% reduction in volume of 
untreated water. 
• “generally positive progress” 
 
The impact of early and powerful environmental policy actions is strong. New 
technologies help reducing water demand, the reduction of climate change helps 
avoiding droughts and flooding, and water quality problems are alleviated. Yet, the 
demand for water in this globalising world are strongly increasing as well, because of 
which water problems remain.   
 
GEO-4 – Europe 
• EC and European Parliament stronger; Euro adopted in more countries 
• Shift of subsidies towards R&D and education 
• Some social groups struggle 
• Plans to adapt to climate change 
• Accent on material consumption continues 
• Overall amount of subsidies decreases 
• Falling water withdrawals 
• “Society has learned to cope with water scarcity” 
 
Summarising, the European version of the global Policy First storyline is only 
moderately positive. Many factors are pointing ‘in the right direction’, with an 
increased environmental protection, and more investment in social capital, R&D and 
education. However, it is specifically noted that some social groups struggle and for 
example that the overall amount of subsidies decreases. In general, the scenario is 
more like a BAU, building more on existing trends, and not specifically surprising, 
challenging, or different compared to today’s world. In many ways this scenario 
resonates the scenario it was based on, the GSG’s Conventional World – Policy 
Reform. 
 
IIIb Global Sustainability – Technological solutions 
As can also be seen in Table 4, there are a number of scenarios that assume a 
globalising world, where the main solutions for environmental, social, and economic 
problems are technological in nature. The best global example is the Techo Garden 
scenario from the MA, and the European scenario Knowledge is King developed in 
Visions.  
These scenarios assume worlds that rely strongly on environmentally sound 
technology, using highly managed, often engineered, ecosystems to deliver ecosystem 
services. However, these technological solutions sometimes create new problems and 
the costs of managing the environment are continually rising. This scenario archetype 
contains many more surprises and non-linearities than type IIIa. There is no 
equivalent in the scenario set of GEO.  
 
 
IV Regional Sustainability 
The last main group of scenarios are those that sketch out developments that lead to a 
regionally divided, but sustainable future. In many aspects, this archetype is different 
from the previous three. First of all, these scenarios assume a future that deviates 
strongest from the current situation. More specifically, it assumes radical (local) social 
and cultural changes, that have far-reaching economical, political, and environmental 
consequences. Secondly, it is the only archetype in which regional forces guide world 
developments. The Continental Barriers archetype also envisions a regionally 
compartmentalised world, but the discontinuation of the globalisation process is the 
result of the failure of initially essentially global forces and a subsequent breakdown 
of society.  
This Regional Sustainability archetype could be regarded as paradoxal. The scenarios 
are part of a global exercise, but offer a package of regional solutions and picture a 
diverse world bound together by a mosaic of local initiatives from which a globally 
sustainable world emerges. On the other hand, it is important to reason through the 
potential consequences of such a ‘green’ but fragmented world. 
 
The GEO-3/4 scenario Sustainability First is categorised as this type of scenario, even 
though certain elements assume a rather globalised world and would better match the 
Global Sustainability archetype. 
 
GEO-3 Sustainability First 
A new environment and development paradigm emerges in response to the challenge 
of sustainability, supported by more equitable values and institutions. This is 
accompanied by a radical shift in the way people interact with one another and with 
the world around them. There is a much tighter multi-scale connection between 
governments, citizens and other stakeholder groups in decision-making. A bottom-up, 
top-down consensus is reached on what needs to be done to satisfy basic needs and 
realise personal goals.  
 
This scenario assumes a fundamental change in behaviour that could be termed a ‘new 
sustainability paradigm’. This change takes place at all levels of society, ranging from 
international policy to regional governments, to local NGOs. Change is in general 
driven by local initiatives but with a strong support at higher levels. This double 
positive feedback spirals the world into a fundamentally different direction. 
Globalisation is redefined focusing on environmental aspects, and there is a strong 
focus on new technologies. Additionally, there is a myriad of dialogues between 
individuals as well as new international initiatives. Important problems are mostly 
related to the enormous economic costs.  
 
GEO-3 Sustainability First – Other relevant points   
• a more visionary state prevails 
• myriad dialogues between individuals 
• Local Agenda 21 spreads 
• multi-scale initiatives 
• new governmental initiatives (e.g. Global Forest Watch) 
• EU expands further 
• “new sustainability paradigm” 
• the switch is most significant in North America and Western Europe 
• globalisation is redefined focusing on positive aspects 
• strong focus on new technologies, but poor distribution 
• change driven by local with strong support at higher levels 
• very positive scenario driven by multi-scale behaviour change 
 
Most important water-related impacts: 
• trading of ‘virtual’ water as agricultural products 
• new technologies solve problems: improvement in water use efficiency, 
desalination etc. 
 
The information on water is relatively sparse in this scenario. However, it is evident 
that water problems will be reduced. The behavioural change will lead to a reduction 
in water demand as well as an improvement in water quality. New multi-scale laws 
and treaties and the success of local Agenda 21 initiatives (and also the Water 
Framework Directive)  will benefit the environment and water quality. The local 
character of the initiatives inhibits a widespread adoption which hampers solutions in 
some cases. 
 
GEO-4 – Europe 
• increased consensus between government and citizens 
• slow economic growth, high additional costs 
• improvement quality of life 
• technological breakthroughs 
• less pressure on water resources (less demand) 
• still high number of people live with severe water stress 
• water quality improves 
• people and industry have ‘learned to cope’ 
• agricultural subsidies disappear, environmental policies continue 
 
Summarising, the European Sustainability First scenario is as positive as the global 
version. The multi-scale, multi-sectoral behavioural change, accompanied by 
important technological breakthroughs assure a higher quality of life while 
maintaining the environment. The only drawback seems to be the economic cost, but 
the ‘new sustainability paradigm’ seems to ensure that this is easily accepted as 
unavoidable. 
 
2.4 The role of water in narrative storylines 
All of the global and European scenario efforts treat the issue of water. The future of 
water supply, water demand, and water quality are all uncertain and linked to the main 
driving forces as incorporated in most scenario studies. Two studies stand out in 
providing information on water, the World Water Outlook and the European 
Environment Outlook. Furthermore, explicit information on water is available 
particularly in the MA and GEO-3.  
 
2.4.1 Driving forces across the scenarios and relevance for water 
 
Excellent overviews of the driving forces and their assumed changes on various 
scenario archetypes are given by Westhoek et al. (unpublished draft) and Busch 
(2006), although their scenario archetypes differ slightly from the ones presented here.  
The adapted assumptions are given in Table 4. Below follows an analysis of the 
importance of each driver for water-related issues. 
 
Table 4. Changes in main drivers in the scenario archetypes. 
 I Global Market IIa Continental 
(Fortress) 
IIb Continental 
(Breakdown) 
IIIa Global 
Sustainability 
(Policy) 
IIIb Global 
Sustainability 
(Technology) 
IV Regional 
Sustainability 
Economic 
development 
very rapid slow very slow rapid rapid slow 
Population 
growth 
low high high low high medium 
Technology  
development 
rapid slow slow medium-rapid very rapid slow-medium 
Environmental 
attitude 
reactive reactive reactive reactive- 
proactive 
proactive proactive 
Trade globalisation barriers barriers globalisation globalisation barriers 
Institutional 
strength 
policies help 
economy 
strong national 
governments 
lack of control policies help 
market failures 
technology and 
strong institutes 
local steering 
State of 
environment 
very poor degrading first degrading, 
later improving 
improving improving improving (local 
differences) 
Main objective economic 
growth 
security (failing) security economy and 
environment 
various goals local 
sustainability 
Corresponding 
GEO scenario 
Markets 
First 
Security  
First 
- Policy  
First 
- Sustainability 
First 
 
 
Economic development 
Crucial in scenarios; important, but mostly indirectly related to water 
Economic development is the most important underlying driver in most of the 
scenarios, and especially in Global Markets and Global Sustainability. However, the 
direct link with water is not very strong. More economic growth will result in a higher 
demand for food, for agricultural products and therefore water demand will be higher. 
Yet, the influence of international trade and population growth are similar and 
normally stronger. Particularly when the environmental attitude is proactive, the effect 
of economic growth is offset with policies or technological improvements. In 
summary, although at the heart of many scenarios, economic growth by itself does not 
strongly influence water demand. On the other hand, the indirect effects of (lack of) 
economic growth can be significant. A general reasoning is that lower economic 
growth results in less incentive for environmental policies and less overall attention to 
the environment. The reasoning is less relevant for developed countries. 
 
 
Population growth 
One of the most important drivers; high level of certainty  
The global population will grow in all scenarios. This places a direct and strong 
demand on food and thus on (agricultural) water demand. Moreover, built-up area will 
grow, which can lead to local water pollution effects. Moreover, more people will live 
in areas prone to drought or floods, which will increase human exposure to these 
extreme events. There are several sub-factors related to overall population growth that 
are equally important. To mention a few: in-migration (including tourism); 
outmigration (land abandonment); and ageing. These are related to total number of 
people, but also to changes in culture and tradition, which in turn will alter water 
demand. Population growth including migration patterns is one of the most important 
drivers in relation to water. Additionally, it is one of the less uncertain of the 
important drivers. 
 
Technology development 
Very important for water demand; focus on technology transfer 
The importance of new technologies has a prominent role predominantly in the 
proactive scenarios, i.e. Global Sustainability and Regional Sustainability. 
Particularly in archetype IIIb, where technological development is stimulated and 
transfer in the globalised world is relatively quick, technology development is crucial. 
However, new technologies are assumed to be introduced in all scenario archetypes. 
Many of the envisioned technologies have direct implications for water management. 
For example, in dry areas, water salinisation, drought-resistant crops and other related 
technologies could potentially increase water supply and have a decisive importance. 
Most technologies that are mentioned are not new but currently too expensive, which 
shifts the key question to technology transfer rather than development. In any case, 
new technologies can heavily influence future RBM strategies  
 
Environmental attitude 
Essential in ‘proactive’ scenarios 
The second axis of most scenario studies, and thus the second key future uncertainty 
besides globalisation versus regionalisation, is environmental attitude. In fact, most 
sets of scenarios consider this to be the single most important change needed to reach 
a future state where sustainable development includes the environment. Yet, just how 
this essentially bottom-up change should take place is often poorly elaborated. 
Nevertheless, the main message is that without a fundamental change in 
environmental attitude, it is for instance difficult to imagine a world with a 
successfully implemented Water Framework Directive (WFD). As such, it is the most 
influential driver of all. At the same time, however, it is also the most uncertain one. 
For water issues, this is equally true.  
 
Trade  
Important for Europe; tightly related to other drivers 
International trade is directly related to agricultural production in any given region, 
and thus directly to water use. Trade is tightly related to a number of other drivers, 
most importantly economic development, but has a more direct impact. Trade also 
relates to international economic blocs such as the EU, and organisations such as the 
WTO or World Bank. Particularly trade liberalisation could have a strong impact on 
the agricultural sector and water use.   
 
 
 
Institutional strength 
Very important in ‘regulated’ scenarios 
This driver relates both to the strength of institutions and the level at which they are 
most active and influential. The rate of success of the WFD, for instance, partly 
depends on assumptions on the role of the government. This is a driver that is almost 
omnipresent in any of the scenario archetypes. Many of the so called scenario 
branchpoints are in some way related to either local or international governance. 
Often strength of institutions depends on public attitudes and/or economic growth and 
human well-being.  
 
State of the environment 
Very important in proactive scenarios 
Strictly spoken, this is not an initial driver of the system. Yet, in the proactive 
scenario archetypes, it is assumed that the environment is increasingly important, 
resulting in relatively environmentally healthy future outlooks such as Techno Garden 
or New Sustainability. The tendency to act more environmentally friendly has 
consequences for the water issue.  
 
 
2.4.2 Critical uncertainties related to water 
Gallopin and Rijsberman (2000) list 10 key uncertainties related to water that are 
either very difficult to anticipate or that have a very strong influence on water 
resources. They used these uncertainties to construct the World Water Visions. 
Although the WWV scenarios do not completely match the scenario archetypes, the 
uncertainties are equally valid and cover a broad spectrum of relevant issues: 
1. Water productivity trends, including water use efficiency and the role of 
technological innovation and rate of adoption. 
2. Expansion of irrigated agriculture, which is accounting for 70% of total water 
use. 
3. Production increase from rainfed agriculture, mostly through partial irrigation 
or new crops.  
4. Dematerialisation of economies. Through technology increase in agriculture, 
or favouring other sectors over agriculture.  
5. National self-sufficiency versus global food security. Global system would be 
more water efficient.  
6. Availability of cheap water-purifying technology.  
7. Public acceptance of GMOs.  
8. Public opposition of large dams.  
9. Fundamental scientific discoveries. Many are theoretically possible and some 
could solve the water problem.  
10. Significant changes in human values and lifestyles.  
 
Not all of these ten are equally relevant for the situation in Europe. Especially those 
that are related to “who will feed the world” (e.g. 2-3 on agricultural expansion, or 7 
acceptance of GMOs) and agricultural expansion are less critical to the European 
situation. This list confirms the analysis of the driving forces above: The key 
uncertainties for water in Europe are Technology (including scientific breakthroughs); 
Human Values (including public acceptance); and Globalisation. 
 
 
2.5 Water stories for Europe 
Table 5 summarises the changes in the most important water-related factors in the 
scenario archetypes relevant to GEO. Future developments are based on statements 
made in the various scenarios sets (particularly GEO-3 and GEO-4), and on the 
analysis of the main drivers presented in the previous section. The statements in the 
table reflect the projected main developments in the stories; in some cases there are 
large regional differences.  
 
 
Table 5. Water-related issues in scenario archetypes 
IV Sustainability First Scenario 
archetype 
I Global Market IIa Continental 
(Fortress) 
IIIa Global 
Sustainability 
(Policy) Global Regional 
corresponding  
GEO scenario 
Markets  
First 
Security 
First 
Policy  
First 
Sustainability First 
(global 
developments) 
Sustainability First 
(local 
developments) 
Water 
demand 
Strong increase Sharp increase; 
overuse of 
water 
Increase despite 
strong 
investments 
Decrease (global 
food security; virtual 
water trading) 
Strong decrease 
(local behavioural 
change) 
Water supply Slight increase (new 
technologies) 
Decrease 
(widespread 
drought) 
Increase Strong Increase Increase (with 
drought problems) 
Water stress Increase Strong increase 
(but not for all; 
water transfer 
projects) 
Increase 
(learning to cope 
with scarcity) 
Decrease  
(people and industry 
learned to cope) 
Decrease (but still 
groups that live 
with water stress) 
Water quality Decrease (hot-spots 
of water pollution) 
Strong 
decrease but 
not for all 
(excessive 
waste) 
Increase 
(increased water 
treatment) 
Increase Increase 
Water 
technology 
Extra investments to 
boost supply and 
quality issues 
Use of old 
technologies 
Strong 
investments 
Strong focus on new 
technologies 
Lower adoption 
rate, less 
breakthroughs 
Water 
distribution 
Large inequalities (rich 
have more access to 
clean water) 
Very large 
inequalities 
(bubbles of 
wealth) 
Very equal, 
although some 
groups struggle 
Very equal Differences 
between regions; 
Europe has 
significant 
improvement 
Water for 
Food 
Much more irrigation, 
more fertiliser, more 
livestock 
agricultural subsidies 
are phased out. 
Agriculture 
remains 
subsidised 
Less subsidies 
Irrigation 
increases 
Subsidies are 
replaced by 
environmental 
payments. 
Agriculture 
becomes more 
traditional and 
extensive. Irrigated 
area is stable 
Water for 
Nature 
 Unprecedented 
environmental 
degradation 
Focus on 
environmental 
protection 
Corridors of national 
parks 
 
Water for 
People 
  Accent on 
consumption 
continues 
 People 
dematerialise and 
need less water 
Other issues Water is privatised  Generally 
positive 
  
 
2.5.1 Water in Markets First 
 
Water demand versus water supply 
This scenario projects an ongoing process of liberalisation and globalisation, in which 
economic growth is maximised on the expense of ecological and social development. 
The biggest water-related uncertainty is the balance between water supply and water 
demand. Water demand will increase because of population growth and economic 
development, which results in a larger per capita water consumption. However, 
technological breakthroughs are assumed to happen that will increase water use 
efficiency and improve crop tolerance to drought. In large parts of Europe, water 
demand will not increase much and it is thus assumed that water demand will be able 
to meet water supply. Moreover, water quality will also not be affected strongly by 
the economic focus taken in this scenario. However, this rosy image does not apply to 
all countries (specifically not to CEE), where per capita water consumption has not 
reached the levels of western Europe.  
 
Water quality 
A strong economic development combined with a laisse faire environmental attitude 
negatively influences water quality. Particularly in CEE, where new investments are 
widespread and economic growth reaches levels of more than 5% per year, the 
pressure on clean water increases. Eutrophication of rivers and lakes, outdated or 
absent wastewater treatment plants, and the lack of strong pressure from governments 
to improve the situation are just a few of the problems that many countries in this 
region face. At the same time in the Mediterranean region, the increased water 
demand and occurrences of drought decrease water quality of aquifers. Widespread 
illegal irrigation, which is said to be up 25% of the total water use, a general lack of 
interest in environmental problems, and intrusion of brackish seawater in coastal areas 
eventually lead to a serious impoverishment of water sources in the Mediterranean. 
Note that the situation in 2050 is fairly heterogeneous. Nevertheless, new and 
established technologies spread fast reducing the initially high number of hot-spots of 
water pollution throughout Europe.  
 
Droughts and flooding (climate change) 
In line with the ongoing process of globalisation, climate change negotiations 
continue with more success than in a compartmentalised world. However, shorter-
term economic interest prevails over long-term environmental concerns, and the 
negotiations result in treaties and agreements that are not binding nations to seriously 
reduce their CO2 emissions. This leads to an acceleration of climate change. Although 
most changes are very long-term and therefore not relevant in the timeframe 
considered here, it is particularly the increase in extreme weather events that do have 
a strong impact. All areas currently experiencing either drought or floodings see a 
strong increase in the number and intensity of these events. In addition, in a number of 
countries both floodings (in spring and autumn) and drought (in summer) become a 
problem. Even in notoriously wet countries such as the Netherlands, dry spells in 
spring and summer demand more irrigation and in places lead to crop loss. The 
struggle against these extreme events is particularly difficult for the agricultural 
sector. Phasing out of the Common Agricultural Policy has made the sector vulnerable 
and in many places the least favourable lands were abandoned, as farmers get 
outcompeted. Those that survive now have very little to hope for from the European 
Union in terms of financial compensation in case of financial set backs caused by 
climate-related events.  
 
The Water Framework Directive 
The overall tendency in the Global Market scenario is towards a more globally 
connected society, as well as a European Union in which internal borders slowly fade. 
As a result, obstacles for international collaboration on watershed management 
become less as the scenario progresses. This also holds for initiatives such as the 
WFD. On the other hand, the scenario also projects a market-based economy, with 
little specific attention for environmental issues. This hampers the further 
development and implementation of the WFD. Although international institutions can 
operate more easily, this might not be the case for WFD with its specific 
environmental goals. It is to be expected will continue to exist, without becoming an 
enforcing instrument. This has consequences especially for the more polluted and 
poorer regions.   
 
 
2.5.2 Water in Security First 
 
Water demand versus supply 
In many ways, this scenario describes a Europe when the transition to a global market 
fails, resulting a regionally focused, reactive world. This might be disastrous for water 
demand. Technology transfer slows, which leads to the continued use of old 
technologies and stagnation of water use efficiency in some regions. Additionally, 
agriculture remains subsidised. This combined effect of the continuation of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) but using partly outdated technologies boosts 
water demand, certainly in the first decades of the scenario. Additionally, water 
transport projects are increasingly sabotaged, resulting in huge water losses. At the 
same time, however, the gaps between poor and rich grows, which slows the demand 
increase. An important consequence of the regionalisation of the world is the failure 
of global measures to stop climate change. This will lead to less water supply 
predominantly in the Mediterranean. Moreover, there is a large difference between the 
rich and the poor. Those that live in the gated communities will have sufficient access 
to new technologies to counteract the increases in demand. But particularly in the 
poorer areas in the countryside, an increase in water stress is to be expected. 
 
Water quality 
Beyond any doubt, water quality will decrease in many places. The increasingly large 
gap between the poor and the rich, in combination with the lack of investment in 
environmental policies and other initiatives, corruption, use of old technologies, and 
the high cost to combat climate change result in a strong decrease of water quality. 
Additionally, international agreements and thus Integrated River Basin Management 
(IRBM) fail, which leads to an increasing pollution of all major rivers in Europe. 
Most of the rich will be ‘protected’ by wastewater treatment plants, but the direct 
environmental degradation and impact on aquatic ecosystems is enormous. 
 
Drought and flooding (climate change) 
As said, climate change and its impacts are by far the worst in the Security First 
scenario. Besides an increase in the intensity and amount of droughts, storms, and 
floods, the impact is also larger then for example in the Global Markets scenario, 
particularly among the poor. Effects are similar as portrayed in the GM scenario, with 
two important differences: First, the agricultural sector remains subsidised. Extensive 
agriculture will therefore not disappear with the same rate. Combined with increased 
drought, this further pushes water demand from the agricultural sector. Secondly, 
overall conditions in the countryside are much worse. The distribution of the available 
water will favour cities, tourism, and industries, while particularly citizens might 
experience severe water stress.  
 
The Water Framework Directive 
It is not surprising that in this fragmented and divided Europe, the WFD does not 
succeed. There is no organised support as national interests prevail, while corruption, 
mistrust and violence severely hamper participatory processes. However, in later 
decades the call for flood protection provides some incentive for international 
collaborations. Additionally, large-scale water-transport projects also involve 
integrated management strategies. These only get started when the impacts of climate 
change are fully visible and start impacting the rich.  
 
 
2.5.3 Water in Policy First 
In this scenario, far-reaching policy reforms are projected to take place. In a 
globalising world, people take advantage of the increased connectivity to implement 
old and new EU-wide policies. In some ways, this is a slightly more positive version 
of the Global Markets scenario.  
 
Water demand versus water supply 
First and foremost, climate change is combated successfully. In fact, new climate 
policies set the stage for an ambitious policy reform. Additionally, governments and 
businesses introduce new technologies that are adopted quickly. As a result, water use 
efficiency increases strongly, while climate slowly stabilises with droughts become 
less frequent. Thus, water supply increases (strongly). Like in the Global Markets 
scenario, it is uncertain how the balance with water demand will be. Investments in 
technology are stimulated which will in the long run reduce water demand. Yet, 
economic development and population growth will put pressure on freshwater 
resources. Although the outlook is more positive than in Global Markets, it is 
uncertain if a framework of European and global policies will suffice to significantly 
reduce problems with water stress. Like in GM, the CAP is phased out, but it is being 
replaced by a strong set of Rural Development Policies to counter land abandonment 
and landscape destruction. As a result, the agricultural sector remains strong, also in 
marginal areas. This, however, puts additional pressure on water demand, which is 
countered with a set of new technologies. All in all, water quantity problems are not 
solved, but ‘society is slowly learning to cope with water scarcity’. 
 
Water quality 
Climate-energy-transport policies, and related technology improvements dominate the 
political agenda. Problems with water quality therefore receive less attention. 
Nonetheless, The improvements in the volume of untreated water are very large. This 
is strongly related to the further implementation and enforcement of the WFD, which 
stimulates participation and local solutions.  
 
Drought and flooding (climate change) 
There is a strong and successful international commitment to combat climate change. 
As a result, droughts and floods are getting less severe and less frequent. However, 
the positive impacts of this climate change policy become apparent only after several 
decades. Shorter-term problems with droughts and floods remain a problem up until 
2030. Technological advances to increase water use efficiency alleviate the problem, 
but investments in this area are relatively small. On the other hand, the 
implementation of the WFD has positive spin-offs in all major watersheds in Europe. 
 
Water Framework Directive 
Beyond doubt, this is the scenario where the WFD is most fully implemented. In the 
rest of the pan-European region, EU-style water management becomes the standard. 
An important side note is that this scenario assumes a predominantly top-down 
stimulation of sustainable development by a variety of policy instruments. A great 
transition with a widespread multi-scale behavioural change does not take place. For 
Europe however, many developments have strong parallels, both because of the strong 
influence of policies (such as the CAP or the WFD) and because of the good starting 
situation in terms of wastewater treatment and water use efficiency.  
 
 
2.5.4 Water in Sustainability First   
This scenario is in all aspects a positive version of the Policy Reform scenario. Policy 
reform goes beyond climate change and the WFD, and is accompanied by a 
behavioural change across scales and sectors, including local actors, businesses, and 
the use of technology. Environmental (and thus water) problems are put centre stage. 
 
Water demand versus water supply 
The point of departure is the Policy First scenario. However, several additional 
developments are assumed that improve that situation. Water demand decreases 
strongly because of a behavioural change towards a lower water consumption. A 
focus on local production of organic food enhances this tendency. Similarly, water 
demand decreases further because the high adoption rate of new technologies due to 
bottom-up initiatives. It is also envisioned that more and more diverse new 
technologies will be developed. On top of that, local initiatives are better adapted to 
the local situation and add to the top-down policy instruments. In short, the 
combination between top-down policies, and bottom-up initiatives improves the water 
quantity problem in many places in Europe. Obviously, even this most positive 
outlook is not for everybody. In certain places the hugely expanded bureaucracy to 
deal with this multi-level governance inhibits progress. Also, clean and cheap 
transport in combination with the generally good prospects boost tourism. 
Construction of second homes in the more favourable climates locally increases water 
demand, that new technologies can only partly compensate for. 
 
Water quality 
In line with the above, water quality will improve dramatically. Local Agenda 21, the 
WFD, technological breakthroughs and swift adoption thereof, and all other aspects of 
the new sustainability paradigm will positively influence water quality throughout 
Europe.  
 
Drought and flooding (climate change) 
Here also, the starting point is that of the Policy First scenario. Climate change is 
combated and eventually droughts and floods decrease in frequency and intensity. 
However, in this scenario it is projected that the short-term problems will be dealt 
with through the use of efficient irrigation systems, and adequate supply lines. This 
complements the widespread change in behaviour, because of which many have 
learned to cope with water stress and accept water problems where they continue to 
exist.  
 
Water Framework Directive 
As in the Policy First scenario, the WFD is implemented. The key difference is a 
stronger bottom-up process, which has positive effects in most river basins, but leads 
to an overly complicated process with many parties involved in others. On a whole, 
the WFD is a less powerful instrument.  
 
As is clear from the above, this scenario is extremely positive. It is important to note 
that most of the developments take years or even decades to become apparent, and it 
comes at a cost. Bureaucracy increases, economic growth is low, and e.g. aviation 
within Europe is limited. It is only because of the assumed change in (local) 
behaviour, that these measurements and its costs are accepted. Thus, there might well 
be places and river basins in which a future unfolds that is less rosy that the one 
projected here. Additionally, this is the scenario with the highest uncertainty, as many 
developments are projected that are radically different from today and are 
accompanied by a paradigm shift. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
• The GEO-4 scenarios were selected as principal input in the Fast-Track 
scenarios, both for the qualitative and quantitative scenarios. 
• The differences between the various scenario studies was not very large. 
Particularly the MA scored high as well. The various water-related scenario 
studies scored relatively low. 
• The GEO-3 and GEO-4 storylines provide an excellent starting point for 
further storyline development both at pan-European and at Pilot Area level. 
• The scenario archetype analysis showed that various scenario studies – notably 
the MA, IPCC-SRES, and GSG – constructed their scenarios along the same 
two major uncertainties as the GEO-3/4, although there is no perfect match. 
With some caution it will be possible to include information from other 
scenario assessments in the scenario development process that is based on the 
GEO scenarios. 
• There is abundant water-related and Europe-specific information in the GEO-
3/4 scenarios. Part of this information is related to output from quantitative 
scenarios (WaterGAP), part of it inherent to the storyline.  
 
2.7 Next steps 
The storylines as described here are part of the so-called Fast-Track procedure of 
SCENES. Together with the Fast-Track quantitative models runs of the WaterGAP 
model (see WP3, deliverable D3.1), they provide the starting point for all scenario-
development activities. They will be discussed and reviewed by the pan-European 
panel in a series of three workshops. Similarly, they will be presented at all Pilot Area 
stakeholder workshops, assuming that they can be used as a set of wind tunnels that 
will provide boundary conditions for all the Pilot Area scenarios. The Fast-Track 
scenarios will thus ensure that both the pan-European and the local scenarios in all 
Pilot Areas be not only methodologically consistent, but will also depart from the 
same set of Fast-Track scenarios.  
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